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One of the remarkable features of quantum mechanics is the ability to ensure secrecy. Private
states embody this effect, as they are precisely those multipartite quantum states from which two
parties can produce a shared secret that cannot under any circumstances be correlated to an external
system. Naturally, these play an important role in quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum
information theory. However, a general distillation method has heretofore been missing. Inspired
by Koashi’s complementary control scenario [M. Koashi, e-print arXiv:0704.3661 (2007)], we give a
new definition of private states in terms of one party’s potential knowledge of two complementary
measurements made on the other and use this to construct a general method of private state distil-
lation using quantum error-correcting codes. The procedure achieves the same key rate as recent,
more information-theoretic approaches while demonstrating the physical principles underlying pri-
vacy of the key. Additionally, the same approach can be used to establish the hashing inequality for
entanglement distillation, as well as the direct quantum coding theorem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appeal to physical concepts such as the uncertainty
principle and entanglement formed the basis of the orig-
inal security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD).
An uncertainty relation between complementary observ-
ables inspired the first, Mayers’s security proof of the
BB84 protocol [1]. Later, building on arguments from
Lo and Chau [2], Shor and Preskill [3] showed how BB84
could be understood as a virtual entanglement distilla-
tion protocol, thereby using the monogamy of entangle-
ment to ensure the privacy of the key. This method
subsequently found wide application not only to spe-
cific [4, 5, 6, 7] and generic [8] ideal protocols, but also to
protocols including a description of realistic devices [9].
Recently, Koashi combined the two methods [10] and for-
mulated a simple security proof for BB84 with uncharac-
terized detectors [11].
A somewhat different, more information-theoretic ap-
proach adapts classical schemes of extracting secret bits
from partially private data to the case in which the eaves-
dropper holds quantum information. If X , Y , and Z are
classical random variables held by two honest parties Al-
ice and Bob, along with an eavesdropping third party,
Eve, then a result by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner states that by
one way communication from Alice to Bob the honest
parties can extract a key at a rate of I(X :Y )−I(X :Z) bits
from asymptotically many such random variables [12].
Devetak and Winter showed how to distill secret keys
from tripartite quantum states at the quantum version of
this rate, obtained by replacing Bob’s and Eve’s classi-
cal random variables with quantum states [13]. Building
on a result by Renner and Ko¨nig [14], Kraus, Gisin, and
Renner established the security of generic QKD proto-
cols operating at this rate using arbitrary universal hash
functions [15, 16, 17].
The essential difference between the two approaches
lies in the basis of privacy and the treatment of the eaves-
dropper. In the latter, privacy is established directly.
Alice and Bob employ privacy amplification to eliminate
any information Eve may have about their prospective
classical key, even if she holds quantum information.
This general approach works in any kind of cryptographic
setting, classical, quantum, or otherwise, provided Alice
and Bob have some estimate of Eve’s information. In the
quantum setting, this estimate can be obtained by assum-
ing Eve holds the purification of the quantum state held
by Alice and Bob; that this limits her information is the
reason QKD is possible from this point of view.
In the former approach, the honest parties no longer
concern themselves with the details of the eavesdrop-
per, but instead concentrate on creating a quantum state
that can produce a secret key when appropriately mea-
sured. For example, maximal entanglement will ensure
privacy of a key generated in any basis by the monogamy
property mentioned above. Entanglement is sufficient for
this purpose, but unnecessary; the broader class of states
suitable for creating keys are termed private states [18].
These are closely related to maximally entangled states,
but may also include additional systems, collectively
called the shield. The shield does not contribute directly
to the key, but, as the name suggests, serves to block
its correlations from would-be eavesdroppers. From this
perspective, the success of QKD hinges on the existence
of quantum correlations which implies that the results of
certain measurements are completely secret.
Each approach has its advantages. The physical pic-
ture is perhaps more intuitive, tracing the origins of pri-
vacy to physical concepts such as entanglement, comple-
mentarity, and the uncertainty principle. On the other
hand, the information-theoretic approach has led to more
general proofs with higher lower bounds and lower upper
bounds on the secret key rate [13, 15, 16, 17].
These results, specifically rates of secret key distilla-
tion, have also been used to derive some of the central
results of quantum information theory, namely the hash-
ing inequality on the asymptotic rate of entanglement
distillation and the direct quantum coding theorem for
2the quantum channel capacity. In principle, it should be
possible to arrive at the same results in the physical pic-
ture, as every key distillation protocol in principle leads
to a private state distillation protocol by performing the
operations coherently [19]. Put differently, the results
from the information-theoretic viewpoint can be used to
construct such distillation protocols, but these have not
yet been fully understood from the more physical point
of view.
We provide the missing piece of the puzzle in this paper
by formulating a new characterization of private states
based on the uncertainty principle and using this to con-
struct a protocol using Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS)
codes [20, 21], which distills private states at the quan-
tum Csisza´r-Ko¨rner rate. The essential idea is that if and
only if measurements on Alice’s key system in either one
of two conjugate bases can be perfectly predicted by the
other systems available to the honest parties, then the
joint state is a private state and Eve can have no correla-
tion with the key. In particular, Bob’s key system should
be perfectly correlated with Alice’s, while the shield may
be used to predict her conjugate observable.
Here, privacy of the key rests on quantum-mechanical
complementarity, since the fact that either of the conju-
gate observables could be predicted by the honest par-
ties means that Eve has no correlation with either. This
echoes the recent result by Koashi showing that se-
cret key distillation is equivalent to a protocol involving
complementary measurements he termed complementary
control [22], and indeed our work is inspired by these re-
sults.
By explicitly including Bob and the shield into the
analysis, the means of private state distillation become
clear: Alice merely needs to reveal some information
about her key system such that the other systems could
in principle predict both measurements. We shall demon-
strate how the syndromes of a CSS code are ideally
suited for this purpose, and that the resulting distilla-
tion protocol essentially amounts to applying a slightly
modified Holevo-Schumacher-Westmoreland (HSW) the-
orem [23, 24] twice. Constructing a distillation procedure
in this manner, one focused on the shared quantum cor-
relations, generalizes the quantum privacy amplification
method of Deutsch et al. [25] and recalls the connection
between quantum privacy and quantum coherence dis-
covered by Schumacher and Westmoreland [26].
This approach also gives a new proof of the hashing
inequality, which states that the rate of one-way entan-
glement distillation using many copies of the state ρAB
is lower bounded by the coherent information Ic(A〉B) =
S(B)− S(AB) (the same lower bound applies to the ex-
tractable one-way secure key rate). As discussed in [27],
this result combined with quantum teleportation pro-
vides proof of the direct quantum coding theorem, which
gives a lower bound to the quantum channel capacity in
terms of the coherent information. The main difference
from previous proofs is that we bound Eve’s information
about the key by the amount of information that Bob can
obtain about Alice’s conjugate basis measurement, which
then leads to an explicit construction of the decoder.
The paper is organized as follows. First we give the
new characterization of private states in Sec. II, and
show how quantitative statements of complementarity
such as the entropic uncertainty principle of Maassen
and Uffink [28] and a related mutual information trade-
off given by Hall [29] imply privacy of the key. We then
extend this to the case of approximate private states in
Sec. III, explaining the relation to Koashi’s complemen-
tary control scenario. Section IV presents our main re-
sults, which we divide into two parts. We first prove
a one-shot distillation theorem showing how to use the
structure of CSS codes for private state distillation, in
a form useful as a building block for QKD security
proofs. We then give a distillation protocol based on
these ideas that achieves the quantum Csisza´r-Ko¨rner
rate. In Sec. V, we use a coherent version of those ar-
guments to prove the hashing inequality. In Sec. VI, we
discuss relation to previous work, and we conclude in
Sec. VII with a summary and open problems.
II. EXACT PRIVATE STATES
A perfect secret key shared by Alice and Bob is a
uniformly distributed random variable about which the
eavesdropper Eve has zero information, or more formally,
κABE :=
(
1
d
∑d−1
k=0 P
A
k ⊗ PBk
)
⊗ ρE for some ρE , where
Pk := |k〉〈k| is the projector onto “standard” basis ele-
ment |k〉. Note that this choice of basis is arbitrary for
each system. Although we use a quantum-mechanical
description, note that Alice and Bob’s systems are essen-
tially classical; states of this form are sometimes termed
ccq states to reflect this fact.
Private states, meanwhile, are quantum states for
which standard basis measurements by Alice and Bob
yield a perfect secret key. When producing a key from
an alphabet of d letters, the key registers A and B are
d-dimensional quantum systems. Additionally, they may
possess some auxiliary “shield” systems that are not di-
rectly involved in creating the key. These systems are
nevertheless important as they are not held by the eaves-
dropper and can shield the key correlations from her.
Although the shield may have several parts distributed
between Alice and Bob, here we lump them together into
the system labelled S.
In contrast to the explicit reference to Eve’s system in
the definition of secret keys, the privacy of a state γABS
can be determined solely from the systems held by Alice
and Bob. The canonical example of such an effect comes
from a maximally entangled state, which by virtue of
the monogamy of entanglement creates secret keys upon
measurement. Though there is no shield in this example,
it makes the point that the quantum correlations between
Alice and Bob’s systems are enough to establish secrecy
of the key.
3Private states are in fact closely related to maximally
entangled states, as shown by [18]. To recapitulate their
result, first define a twisting operator to be a controlled
unitary of the form UABS :=
∑
jk P
A
j ⊗PBk ⊗V Sjk for any
arbitrary unitaries V Sjk. Then Theorem 1 of [18] states
that γABS is a private state iff it is of the form
γABS = UABS(ΦABd ⊗ ξS)U †ABS , (1)
where ξS is an arbitrary state and ΦABd is the density
operator associated with the canonical entangled state
|ΦABd 〉 := 1√d
∑d−1
k=0 |kk〉AB; note that actually only the
Vkk are relevant. Clearly, measurement of the A and
B systems results in a secret key since the same key
would result if the state were first untwisted, and Eve
cannot distinguish the cases in which the state has been
untwisted or not. Conversely, purifying a secret key and
using the fact that Eve’s marginal state is fixed along
with the fact that purifications of a fixed marginal are re-
lated by unitaries on the purifying system, i.e. Uhlmann’s
theorem [30, 31], guarantees the form of Eq. (1).
With the help of the uncertainty principle we can for-
mulate a different characterization of private states that
emphasizes the relation of privacy to complementarity
and does not involve statements about Eve’s system.
Consider a hypothetical measurement by one party, say
Alice, on her key qubit in a basis conjugate to the stan-
dard basis. In this context, “conjugate” refers to any ba-
sis whose elements give random outcomes when measured
in the standard basis. A general conjugate basis has el-
ements |x˜〉 := 1√
d
∑d−1
k=0 e
iθxk |k〉 for some set of θxk ∈ R
such that 1
d
∑
k e
i(θxk−θyk) = δxy.
Due to the conjugate nature of the |k〉 and |x˜〉 bases,
complementarity places constraints on the predictability
of both measurements. In particular, the entropic uncer-
tainty relation of Maassen and Uffink [28] states that, for
an arbitrary state ρA,
H(ZA) +H(X˜A) ≥ log2 d, (2)
where ZA and X˜A are any nondegenerate observables
having eigenstates |k〉A and |x˜〉A, respectively, and H is
the Shannon entropy of the outcome probabilities, mea-
sured in bits. Hence, if the outcome of Z is certain, then
the measurement of X˜ must be random and vice versa.
To determine how much information is simultaneously
available, we can include the measurement devices them-
selves in the description, following Hall and Cerf et
al. [29, 32]. Whatever information can be stored in sep-
arate devices is clearly simultaneously accessible, so con-
sider a state ρACD and POVMs Λ˜C and ΓD that are
restricted to systems C and D, respectively. Denoting
the classical conditional entropy of ZA given the mea-
surement result ΓD by H(ZA|ΓD), we have
Lemma 1 (Complementary Information Tradeoff). For
a tripartite quantum state ρACD, conjugate observables
ZA and X˜A, and arbitrary measurements Λ˜C and ΓD,
H(ZA|ΓD) +H(X˜A|Λ˜C) ≥ log2 d (3)
where d = dim(A).
Proof. Consider arbitrary measurements Λ˜C and ΓD.
Since these can be performed independently simultane-
ously, we can define the conditional marginal state ρAjk :=
TrCD[Λ˜
C
j Γ
D
k ρ
ACD]/pjk, for pjk := Tr[Λ˜
C
j Γ
D
k ρ
ACD]. Mea-
surements of ZA and X˜A on each of those states
must obey Eq. (2), which in the current context reads
H(ZA|ΓD=k, Λ˜C=j) + H(X˜A|ΓD=k, Λ˜C=j) ≥ log2 d.
Averaging over the measurement outcomes and using the
fact that conditioning reduces entropy, we obtain the de-
sired result.
Note that no restriction is placed on the ability of a
single system to be correlated with two complementary
Alice observables, only that the correlations not be simul-
taneously realized. Such is the case when ρAB is max-
imally entangled; in the EPR state, for instance, Bob
can predict either the position or momentum of Alice’s
system, but not both at the same time.
The information tradeoff bears directly on the ques-
tion of privacy, as conjugate information can be used to
exclude the eavesdropper’s information about the key.
Define the key to be the outcome of Alice’s observable
ZA, let Eve hold D, and suppose that system C = BS,
i.e. the remainder of the systems under Alice and Bob’s
control. Then if some measurement Λ˜BS of the BS sub-
system can predict the outcome of Alice’s conjugate ba-
sis observable X˜A, Eve can have no information about
the key: H(X˜A|Λ˜BS) = 0 implies H(ZA|ΓE) = log2 d.
Thus, complementarity assures privacy of the secret key
without directly making statements about Eve’s system.
This line of thought leads to the new characterization of
private states:
Theorem 1 (Exact Private States). γABS is a private
state with (nondegenerate) key observables ZA and ZB
iff for some measurement Λ˜BS
(a) H(ZA|ZB) = 0, and (4)
(b) H(X˜A|Λ˜BS) = 0. (5)
Proof. Start with the reverse (if) implication and sup-
pose γABS satisfies the two conditions. By the above
argument, condition (b) implies H(ZA|ΓE) = log2 d and
therefore H(ZA) = log2 d, whence Eve’s marginal states
must be independent of the key. As (a) implies the key
is perfectly correlated, γABS must be a private state.
To prove the forward (only if) implication, we con-
struct the measurement Λ˜BS from the twisting operator
UBS =
∑
k P
B
k ⊗ V Skk. First, condition (a) follows imme-
diately for γABS a private state. The joint probability
4for the conjugate measurement is given by
pxy = Tr[γ
ABSP˜Ax ⊗ Λ˜BSy ]
=
1
d2
∑
jk
ei(θxk−θxj)Tr
[(
|j〉〈k|B ⊗ V SjjξSV †Skk
)
Λ˜BSy
]
=
1
d2
∑
jk
ei(θxk−θxj)Tr
[(|j〉〈k|B ⊗ ξS)U †BSΛ˜BSy UBS]
=
1
d
Tr
[(
P˜ ∗Bx ⊗ ξS
)
U †BSΛ˜BSy U
BS
]
,
where P˜ ∗By is the conjugate of P˜
B
y in the standard
basis. Condition (b) follows by setting Λ˜BSy :=
UBS
(
P˜ ∗By ⊗ 1S
)
U †BS so that pxy ∝ δxy.
From this viewpoint, privacy of the key follows from
the ability of one part of the honest players’ systems to
predict either the key or a complementary observable of
the other part; here we focused on Alice’s system, but
clearly the same result holds for Bob’s.
III. APPROXIMATE PRIVATE STATES
Of course, a realistic QKD protocol can never produce
a perfect secret key or a perfect private state and instead
strives to create a good approximation. But what is a
good approximation? Because the key is meant to be
used in arbitrary further cryptographic applications, the
definition of approximate must be composable so that se-
curity statements about a whole cryptographic process
can be made by individually examining the constituent
parts. In this framework, a sufficient notion of approx-
imate secrecy is furnished by the probability that the
actual key could be distinguished from an exact secret
key. According to Helstrom’s theorem [33], the probabil-
ity of distinguishing between the two quantum states ρ
and σ is bounded by 12 +
1
4Tr
∣∣ρ − σ∣∣. Hence the trace
distance 12Tr
∣∣ρ− σ∣∣ is the important quantity. This mo-
tivates the definition that a shared ǫ-secret key, where ǫ
is called the security parameter, is any ρABE that satis-
fies Tr|ρABE − κABE | ≤ 2ǫ for some perfect secret key
κABE [14, 34].
We could analogously define ǫ-private states to be
states that are ǫ-close to exact private states in trace
distance. These will lead to ǫ-secret keys since the mea-
surement that creates the key is a quantum operation,
and the trace distance can only decrease under quantum
operations. However, the converse is not true: States
not ǫ-close to a private state may nevertheless still gen-
erate ǫ-secret keys. Hence a better approach is simply to
say that ψABS is an ǫ-private state when the key mea-
surement leads to an ǫ-secret key, with the eavesdropper
system E defined as any purifying system of ψABS .
Intuitively, the new characterization of exact private
states should be extendible to the approximate case; if
Alice’s key and conjugate measurements are almost per-
fectly predictable by the BS systems, then the shared
state ought to produce a good approximation of a secret
key. Defining “almost perfect predictability” in terms
of nearly zero conditional entropy, or equivalently nearly
maximal mutual information, will not suffice, as this ap-
proach is not composable [35]. Instead, the following two
theorems show that an alternate definition of approxi-
mate private states can be given in terms of concrete
measurements having small probabilities of error. The
first says that if Bob is able to distinguish Alice’s state
measured in either one of two conjugated bases, then they
share an ǫ-private state, while the second is the converse.
Only the first theorem is needed when constructing a se-
curity proof, but we provide both for completeness and
to highlight the connection between our framework and
Koashi’s complementarity control scenario [22].
Theorem 2. A state ψABS with nondegenerate key ob-
servables ZA and ZB is an (ǫz +
√
ǫx)-private state if
there exists a conjugate observable X˜A and correspond-
ing measurement Λ˜BS such that
pe =
∑
j 6=k
Tr
[
(PAj ⊗ PBk )ψABS
] ≤ ǫz, (6)
p˜e =
∑
x 6=y
Tr
[
(P˜Ax ⊗ Λ˜BSy )ψABS
]
≤ ǫx. (7)
Theorem 3. If ψABS is an ǫ-private state with nonde-
generate key observables ZA and ZB, then for any con-
jugate observable X˜A there exists a corresponding mea-
surement Λ˜BS such that
pe =
∑
j 6=k
Tr
[
(PAj ⊗ PBk )ψABS
] ≤ ǫ, (8)
p˜e =
∑
x 6=y
Tr
[
(P˜Ax ⊗ Λ˜BSy )ψABS
]
≤ 2ǫ− ǫ2. (9)
As the proofs are somewhat technical, we defer them to
Appendix A.
IV. PRIVATE STATE DISTILLATION
With this characterization of approximate private
states, it becomes simple to construct a procedure to dis-
till private states from an arbitrary input. Alice simply
needs to reveal enough information about her system so
that the states of the B and BS systems can be reli-
ably distinguished. The amount of information she must
reveal depends on the details of the state, and no use-
ful answer can be given in the general case. But when
Alice and Bob share asymptotically many copies of an
arbitrary state ψABS , two applications of the HSW the-
orem give the distillation rate, which we show equals the
quantum Csisza´r-Ko¨rner rate.
However, this distillation scenario contains the ad-
ditional subtlety that the information Alice needs to
5reveal ostensibly comes from noncommuting measure-
ments. Avoiding this problem is where CSS error-
correcting codes come into play, as they enable the side
information to be properly defined in terms of commut-
ing variables and also define the form of the key sys-
tem of the distilled state. CSS codes were used by Shor
and Preskill [3] in their proof of the BB84 protocol for
precisely the same purpose, and the following distilla-
tion scheme can be understood as an extension of this
method to arbitrary private states. This section contains
the main results of this paper, which for clarity are sub-
divided into two parts: How the CSS codes enable distil-
lation when Alice’s state has dimension dn, and at what
rate can private states be distilled from many copies of
an arbitrary resource state.
A. One-shot distillation
First we recall a few facts about CSS codes. A CSS
code encoding n −mz −mx qudits into n is defined by
a set of mz +mx (commuting) stabilizer operators, mz
operators of the form Zs = Zs1 ⊗ Zs2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Zsn for
0 ≤ si ≤ d − 1, and mx of the form Xt = Xt1 ⊗Xt2 ⊗
· · · ⊗ Xtn for 0 ≤ ti ≤ d − 1. We have implicitly used
the definition s = (s1, . . . , sn) and the notation that an
operator raised to a string is simply the product of the
operators raised to the elements of the string. To simplify
notation, we adopt the following: |k〉 = |k1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |kn〉,
|ϕk〉 = |ϕk1〉⊗ · · ·⊗ |ϕkn〉, and Pk for Pk1 ⊗· · ·⊗Pkn and
similarly for P˜x in the conjugate basis.
The first operator set, the Z-type stabilizers, defines
a code correcting errors in the standard basis (dit er-
rors, or amplitude errors), while the second, the X-
type stabilizers, defines a code correcting phase errors.
Here, and henceforth, the operators X and Z are the
generalized Pauli operators in d dimensions [36], given
by Z :=
∑d−1
k=0 ω
k|k〉〈k| and X := ∑d−1k=0 |k+1〉〈k| =∑d−1
k=0 ω
−k|x˜〉〈x˜|, where ω := e 2πid .
Measuring the stabilizers yields the amplitude and
phase syndromes α = (α1, . . . , αmz) and β =
(β1, . . . , βmx), to which we associate projectors Πα and
Π˜β, respectively. Since the stabilizers are products of
Zs or Xs, these projectors can be expressed as Πα =∑
k∈[α] Pk and Π˜β =
∑
x∈[β] P˜x. Meanwhile, the [α]
and [β] are equivalence classes of standard and conju-
gate basis states that all share the syndromes α and β,
respectively.
Commuting with the stabilizers (but not included in
them) are the logical or encoded operators Z¯j and X¯j,
one pair for each of the n − mz − mx encoded qudits.
Crucially, these may also be chosen to be of Z and
X type, respectively, an assumption we make through-
out. Let λ and µ be the measurement outcomes of
all the logical operators {Z¯j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n − mx − mz}
and {X¯j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n − mx − mz}, respectively, and
Π¯λ :=
∑
k∈[λ] Pk and Πˆµ :=
∑
x∈[µ] P˜x the associated
projectors for [λ] and [µ] the corresponding equivalence
classes.
The idea behind one-shot distillation is for Alice to
measure the syndromes α and β on her system and re-
veal α to Bob. If the CSS code is properly chosen, this
information should make it possible to distinguish the
corresponding marginals of his key system and the shield,
at which point Theorem 2 would apply to key observ-
ables Z¯j and conjugate observables X¯j . Bob only needs
α, since the mere existence of the conjugate basis mea-
surement implies the secrecy of the key. In QKD, mea-
suring the encoded Z operators is equivalent to privacy
amplification, and the degrees of freedom in defining the
logical operators Z¯j give rise to different families of pri-
vacy amplification functions. Here we present a one-shot
private state distillation theorem useful for QKD security
proofs [59].
Theorem 4 (One-Shot Distillation). Let Alice and Bob
share an arbitrary state ΨABS with dim(A) = dn and
purification |Ψ〉ABSE = ∑k√pk|k〉A|ϕk〉BSE. Suppose
there exists a CSS code with mz Z-type stabilizers and
mx X-type stabilizers whose syndromes α and β are as-
sociated with measurements ΛBα,k and Λ˜
BS
β,x for which
pe =
∑
α
∑
j6=k
Tr
[
(PAj ⊗ ΛBα,k)ΠAαΨAB
] ≤ ǫz, (10)
p˜e =
∑
β
∑
x 6=y
Tr
[
(P˜Ax ⊗ Λ˜BSβ,y)Π˜AβΨABS
]
≤ ǫx. (11)
Then by one-way communication from Alice to Bob they
can distill an (ǫz +
√
ǫx)-private state of size d
n−mz−mx
whose key is the encoded value λ.
Proof. Suppose that Alice measures the syndromesα and
β and makes α public. The post-measurement state is
|Ψ1〉ABSERT :=
∑
α,β Π
A
αΠ˜
A
β |Ψ〉ABSE |α〉R|β〉T where R
is a new public register shared by all parties but T is held
by Alice. Coherently measuring ΛBα,k with the partial
isometry UBB2R produces
|Ψ2〉 := UBB2R|Ψ1〉 =
∑
α,k
√
ΛBα,k ⊗ PRα |Ψ1〉ABSERT |k〉B2 .
Bob can determine the values of Z¯Aj for all j with error
probability
p′e =
∑
λ6=λ′
Tr
[(
Π¯Aα ⊗ Π¯B2λ′
)
ΨAB22
]
=
∑
λ6=λ′
∑
α,β
∑
k∈[λ′]
Tr
[(
Π¯Aλ ⊗ ΛBα,k
)
ΠAαΠ˜
A
βΨ
AB
]
=
∑
λ6=λ′
∑
α
∑
k∈[λ′]
Tr
[(
Π¯Aλ ⊗ ΛBα,k
)
ΠAαΨ
AB
]
≤
∑
α
∑
j6=k
Tr
[(
PAj ⊗ ΛBα,k
)
ΠAαΨ
AB
]
≤ ǫz,
6where we have used [Π¯Aλ , Π˜
A
β ] = 0 and
∑
β Π˜
A
β = 1
A. Al-
ice’s conjugate basis measurement can be accurately pre-
dicted by first undoing UBB2R and then measuring Λ˜BSβ,y.
An entirely similar calculation shows that the resulting
error probability is less than ǫx. Hence, by Theorem 2
Ψ2 is an (ǫz +
√
ǫx)-private state, whose key subsystems
are the encoded subsystems A¯ and B¯2.
As stated, the above theorem only involves one-way
communication. However, it can easily be generalized to
the sorts of two-way error-correction protocols presented
in [35]. The idea is that, instead of making only one
measurement, Alice and Bob execute successive “partial”
measurements of the syndrome of the dit error correction
code, each of which is followed by a round of two-way
classical communication. Each measurement is still as-
sociated with a set of Z-type operators, but the Z-type
operators of the ith round of measurement could depend
on all their previous outcomes. One-way error correc-
tion can be interpreted as the case in which the Z-type
operators are chosen independently.
B. Achievable distillation rates
Now we turn to the achievable distillation rates. Define
an (n, ǫ) distillation protocol for ψABS to be a series of
local quantum operations and classical communication
such that application on ΨABS = (ψABS)⊗n produces an
ǫ-private state. If there exists an (n, ǫn) protocol for every
n, producing a log2 τn-bit approximate private state, such
that limn→∞ ǫn = 0, then the fractional yield of private
outputs to raw inputs defines the achievable rate
R = lim
n→∞
log2 τn
n
. (12)
Finally, the supremum of achieveable rates is called the
one-way distillable privacy P→(ψABS) of the state ψABS .
In the following, we use the label ψa where necessary to
denote that the entropy or mutual information is com-
puted using an extended version ψa
ACBSE of the state
ψABSE . Using the previous result and a slightly modi-
fied version of the HSW theorem given in Appendix B,
we quickly get the following:
Theorem 5 (One-Way Distillable Privacy). Given con-
jugate observables ZA and XA, consider an arbitrary
state ψABS and its extension ψACBSa obtained by copying
the ZA basis of A to C. Then
P→(ψABS) ≥ I(ZA:B)−H(ZA) + I(XA:CBS)ψa .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
d = dim(A) is prime by appending additional |k〉A for
which the corresponding weights pk = 0. Let C be under
Alice’s control so that she can perform the copy oper-
ation and consider ΨACBSa = (ψ
ACBS
a )
⊗n. Pick a CSS
code c from the distribution C given in Appendix C, so
that the Z-type and X-type stabilizers give rise to uni-
versal hash functions (for a definition, see Appendix B),
and let mz =
n
log2 d
[
H(ZA)− I(ZA:B) + 4δ] and mx =
n
log2 d
[
H(XA)ψa − I(XA:CBS)ψa + 4δ
]
for a fixed δ > 0.
Theorem 7 implies that the measurements ΛBα,k con-
structed from these hash functions can predict Alice’s
key with average error probability 〈ǫz,c〉C ≤ 6 · 2−nδ2 .
Similarly, the average error probability of the measure-
ments Λ˜CBSβ,x in predicting the conjugate basis observable
is 〈ǫx,c〉C ≤ 6 · 2−nδ2. Now apply Theorem 4 to each CSS
code, where the shield is the combined system CS, and
average over the different codes. Using the concavity of
the square root and the fact that H(XA)ψa = log2 d, it
follows that Alice and Bob can create an ǫ-private state
having n[I(ZA:B) + I(XA:CBS)ψa − H(ZA) − 8δ] key
bits, for ǫ ≤ 〈ǫz,c〉C+
√〈ǫx,c〉C ≤ 6·2−nδ2+√6 · 2−nδ2 .
By Lemma 2, P→(ψABS) ≥ I(ZA:B) − I(ZA:E), so
this method achieves the same yield of secret key as the
random coding method used by Devetak and Winter [13].
Lemma 2. For conjugate observables ZA and
XA and a state of the form |ψa〉ACBSE =∑
k
√
pk|k〉A|k〉C |ϕk〉BSE , I(XA:CBS) = H(ZA) −
I(ZA:E).
Proof. Rewrite |ψa〉ACBSE as 1√d
∑
x |x˜〉A|ϑx〉CBSE
for |ϑx〉CBSE = ZCx
∑
k
√
pk|k〉C |ϕk〉BSE . Hence
S(ϑCBSx ) = S(ϑ
CBS
0 ) for all x. From the Schmidt de-
composition, S(ϑCBS0 ) = S(ϑ
E
0 ) = S(E) and S(CBS) =
S(AE). Therefore,
I(XA:CBS) = S(CBS)−
∑
x
qxS(ϑ
CBS
x )
= S(AE)− S(ϑCBS0 )
= S
(∑
k
pkP
A
k ⊗ ϕEk
)
− S(E)
= H(ZA)− I(ZA:E).
An immediate corollary is that the distillable privacy of
an arbitrary state ψAB without a specified shield system
must be no less than the coherent information Ic(A〉B) :=
S(B) − S(AB); this can be seen as a weaker version of
the hashing inequality, which we will consider in the next
section.
Corollary 1. P→(ψAB) ≥ Ic(A〉B).
Proof. Pick any observable ZA and define the computa-
tional basis of A as its eigenbasis. Consider the purifi-
cation |ψ〉ABE = ∑k√pk|k〉A|ϕk〉BE of ψAB, and note
that Ic(A〉B) = S(B) − S(E) = I(ZA:B) − I(ZA:E),
where the last equality follows from the fact that
S(ϕBk ) = S(ϕ
E
k ) for all k. From Theorem 5 and Lemma 2,
P→(ψAB) ≥ I(ZA:B)− I(ZA:E) = Ic(A〉B).
7V. HASHING INEQUALITY
Now we turn to the related question of entanglement
distillation and show how the above analysis can be mod-
ified to prove the hashing inequality on the one-way dis-
tillable entanglement E→(ψAB), which is defined anal-
ogously to P→(ψABS). There are two main differences
with the methods used in the preceding section. The
first is that for Theorem 5, it does not matter how the
shield is split between Alice and Bob, but of course for
entanglement distillation Alice and Bob must be able to
locally untwist the private state. The difficulty comes
from the first step, in which Alice copies her key to sys-
tem C, which was then considered part of the shield.
Here, we avoid this problem by showing that after Bob
makes the ΛBα measurement, he effectively has system
C. Thus, he has the entire shield, and can perform the
untwisting operator himself.
The second difference stems from the definition of ap-
proximate private states as states that yield approximate
secret keys when measured. Because we must now per-
form all measurements coherently, these results are not
directly applicable. Modifying them is possible, but we
prefer to give a more direct argument, which has the side
benefit of yielding a better approximation parameter.
Theorem 6 (Hashing Inequality). E→(ψAB)≥Ic(A〉B).
Proof. The proof proceeds by successively performing the
ΛBα and Λ˜
B
β measurements coherently and showing how
the result is close to an entangled state. Purify ψAB to
|ψ〉ABE = ∑d−1k=0√pk|k〉A|ϕk〉BE . Without loss of gen-
erality, we can assume that d = dim(A) is prime by ap-
pending additional states |k〉 for which pk = 0. Now
define |Ψ〉ABE := (|ψ〉ABE)⊗n = ∑k√pk|k〉A|ϕk〉BE ,
where pk = pk1pk2 · · · pkn .
Suppose Alice picks a CSS code c from the distribu-
tion C described in Appendix C with mz Z-type and
mx X-type stabilizers, measures the dit and phase error
syndromes α and β, and declares them publicly. This
transforms the state into
|Ψ1〉 :=
∑
α,β
ΠAαΠ˜
A
β |Ψ〉ABE |α,β〉R, (13)
where R is a publicly-held register.
Let mz =
n
log2 d
[
H(ZA)ψ − I(ZA:B)ψ + 4δ
]
for some
arbitrary δ > 0. By Theorem 7, there exists a measure-
ment ΛBα that predicts Alice’s key with error probability
ǫz,c such that 〈ǫz,c〉C ≤ 6 · 2−nδ2 . Performing this mea-
surement coherently yields
|Ψ2〉 :=
∑
k,α,β
ΠAαΠ˜
A
β
√
ΛBα,k|Ψ〉ABE |k〉C |α,β〉R,
where the output is stored in system C. This state is
essentially identical to the one in which Bob simply has
a copy of Alice’s key,
|Ψ′2〉 :=
∑
α,β
ΠAαΠ˜
A
β |Ψa〉ABCE |α,β〉R, (14)
where |Ψa〉 = |ψa〉⊗n, as defined in Theorem 5, except
that Bob holds C. Computing the fidelity, we obtain
〈Ψ2|Ψ′2〉 =
∑
α,k∈[α]
pk〈ϕk|
√
ΛBα,k|ϕk〉BE
≥
∑
α,k∈[α]
pk〈ϕk|ΛBα,k|ϕk〉BE ≥ 1− ǫz,c,
using the fact that
√
Λ ≥ Λ for 0 ≤ Λ ≤ 1. Since
the fidelity bounds the trace distance via Tr|ρ − σ| ≤
2
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2 [37], we have Tr|Ψ2 −Ψ′2| ≤ 2
√
2ǫz,c.
Now rewrite |Ψ′2〉 as |Ψ′2〉 =
∑
x
√
qx|x˜〉A|ϑx〉BCE and
let mx =
n
log2 d
[
H(XA)ψa − I(XA:BC)ψa + 4δ
]
. By
Theorem 7, there exists a measurement Λ˜BCβ that can
predict the outcome of a conjugate measurement on A
with error probability ǫx,c such that 〈ǫx,c〉C ≤ 6 · 2−nδ2 .
Starting from |Ψ′2〉, suppose Bob coherently measures Λ˜β
and store the result in D. This gives
|Ψ′3〉 :=
∑
y,α,β
ΠAαΠ˜
A
β
√
Λ˜BCβ,y|Ψa〉ABCE |y˜〉D|α,β〉R.
As before, this is essentially the same as the state |Ψ′′3〉
in which Bob has a copy of Alice’s string x in system D,
|Ψ′′3〉 =
∑
x,α,β
√
qxΠ
A
αΠ˜
A
β |x˜〉A|x˜〉D|ϑx〉BCE |α,β〉R, (15)
and a similar calculation to the one above shows that
Tr|Ψ′3 −Ψ′′3 | ≤ 2
√
2ǫx,c.
Implicit in rewriting |Ψ′2〉 using Alice’s conjugate basis
is the fact that
√
qx|ϑx〉BCE =
∑
k
√
pk〈x˜|k〉|k〉C |ϕk〉BE .
Substituting this in Eq. (15) gives
|Ψ′′3〉 =
1√
dn
∑
x,α,β
ΠAαΠ˜
A
β |x˜〉A|x˜〉D|α,β〉R
⊗
∑
k
√
pk ω
x·k|k〉C |ϕk〉BE .
Bob can now decouple subsystem BCE by using the
operator UBD =
∑
k,x ω
−x·kP˜Dx ⊗ PBk , and the result is
an entangled state in the encoded subsystem A¯D¯,
|Ψ′′4〉 := UBD|Ψ′′3〉 =
1√
dn
∑
α,β
ΠAαΠ˜
A
β |Φdn〉AD|α,β〉R
⊗
∑
k
√
pk|k〉C |ϕk〉BE . (16)
Since they never hold exactly |Ψ′2〉 or |Ψ′′3 〉, Alice and
Bob only end up with a good approximation to an entan-
gled state. To determine how good, we can use proper-
ties of the trace distance. Call the unitaries implement-
ing the coherent measurements UBCz and U
BCD
x , respec-
tively, and define WBCD = UBDUBCDx U
BC
z . Applying
W to Ψ1 generates Ψ4, and by the triangle inequality
and unitary invariance of the trace distance, we have
Tr
∣∣Ψ4 −Ψ′′4 ∣∣ ≤ 2(√2ǫz,c +√2ǫx,c). (17)
8The next step is to average over all CSS codes. Using
the concavity of the square root and the fact that the
trace distance cannot increase under the partial trace,
we obtain
Tr|ΨA¯D¯4 − ΦA¯D¯| ≤ 8
√
3 · 2−nδ2 . (18)
Finally, we must show that the resulting rate
is given by the coherent information. Since
H(XA)ψa = log2 d, (n − mx − mz) log2 d =
n
[
I(ZA:B)ψ + I(X
A:BC)ψa −H(ZA)ψ − 8δ
]
. By
Lemma 2, I(XA:BC)ψa = H(Z
A)ψa − I(ZA:E)ψa .
Clearly H(ZA)ψ = H(Z
A)ψa and similarly for the
quantum mutual information of ZA with B or E. Since
I(A〉B)ψa = I(ZA:B)ψ − I(ZA:E)ψ, as in Corollary 1,
(n−mx−mz) log2 d = nIc(A〉B)ψ−8nδ, which concludes
the proof.
VI. RELATION TO PREVIOUS WORK
The present work is an outgrowth of earlier work on
private states by one of us [38] and draws much inspi-
ration from the work of Koashi [10, 22]. In particular,
Theorems 2 and 3 are closely related to the first two the-
orems of [22], in which Koashi defines the two protocols of
the complementary control scenario. It is easy to see that
our condition on the predictability of the key is equiva-
lent to his condition on the primary protocol, and that
our condition on the measurement Λ˜BS implies his con-
dition on the secondary protocol. Therefore, Theorem 2
is a corollary of the first theorem of [22]. Although we
were not able to show that the condition on the secondary
protocol implies our condition on the measurement Λ˜BS,
Theorem 3 can be proven using arguments very similar
to those found in [22].
Meanwhile, Theorem 4 corresponds conceptually to the
inclusion of the complementary control scenario in the se-
curity analysis of [10], with several important differences
in the details. First, we do not consider parameter esti-
mation at all, while [10] presents a full security analysis
for BB84. To complete a security proof using our re-
sults, one would need to determine what quantum states
ψABS are compatible with the output of the parameter
estimation phase of the protocol in order to apply Theo-
rems 4 and 5. This can be done with an estimate of the
quantum channel noise obtained indirectly from the ex-
perimental measurements. The advantage of Theorem 4
is that it could be used to prove the security of a more
general set of QKD protocols, even those including pre-
processing. Second, [10] assumes that Bob’s conjugate
measurement is independent of β, with the supplemen-
tal information supplied only after the measurement is
made. In our method, Bob uses the syndrome β to con-
struct the measurement Λ˜BSβ . Generally, the latter is no
less powerful than the former, and avoids the pitfalls of
locking of accessible information [39]. In Appendix D we
provide a concrete example in which allowing Λ˜BSβ to de-
pend on β yields a better security parameter than if it
were independent.
The smaller difference concerns the step in [10] of hav-
ing Alice encrypt the amplitude error syndromes using a
preshared secret key. This removes the need to use a CSS
code [40], but requires a key of size O(n log d) bits [in ad-
dition to the authentication key, of size O(log n · log d)]
and makes a small but practically significant difference
for QKD. Theorem 4 can be modified to encrypt the syn-
drome α of an arbitrary (not necessarily linear) code as
follows. Supposing Alice and Bob already share a per-
fect secret key ℓ of the same size as the amplitude er-
ror syndrome α. Alice publicly transmits α+ ℓ to Bob.
He recovers α using ℓ and can then make the ΛBα mea-
surement. The system R storing the value of α is un-
known to Eve and can be decoupled with the operator∑
α Π
B
α⊗(XR)−α since this does not affect the key mea-
surements. We can now apply Theorem 4 directly on the
resulting correlated state. Using these ideas, one can eas-
ily show that the final security parameter would have a
similar form with or without encrypting of the dit error
syndrome.
By adapting Koashi’s complementarity scenario, we
are able to construct a means for distilling private states
from arbitrary resource states at a rate given by the quan-
tum Csisza´r-Ko¨rner bound. This complements the result
of Devetak and Winter [27], showing more directly how
physical (quantum-mechanical) phenomena are respon-
sible for the privacy of the key. As mentioned before,
it must be possible to view their result as private state
distillation by performing the operations coherently, and
indeed a twisting operator plays an important role in
their derivation of the hashing inequality, specifically the
operator U defined on p. 8 of [13]. Mathematically speak-
ing, the difference in the two approaches can be traced to
the origins of this operator: here from the measurement
used in the HSW theorem to determine the outcome of
Alice’s conjugate measurement, there from the quantum
Chernoff bound via Uhlmann’s theorem.
A different approach to private state distillation is
taken in [41], whose ultimate goal is to show that key
distribution is still possible over channels whose quan-
tum capacity is zero, rather than give rates on private
state distillation. The distillation portion of the proto-
col accepts only certain inputs, namely twisted versions
of noisy entangled states, and thus the distillation pro-
cedure works by untwisting the state and then applying
entanglement distillation. The difficulty in this scheme
then lies in determining the optimal combination of twist-
ing operator and noise such that the given input can be
expressed in this form. As such, no closed-form distil-
lation rate expressions can be given, and happily this is
not relevant to their goal.
Our method of private state distillation gives a new
proof of the hashing inequality, which then also implies
a new proof of the direct quantum coding theorem. This
version differs from previous work [13, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46,
47] in several ways, mainly by the explicit use of CSS
9codes from the beginning and the fact that the decoder
is constructed from the measurement used in the HSW
theorem, rather than by decoupling Eve and appealing
to Uhlmann’s theorem. This construction resolves the
open question raised in the conclusion of [47] as here the
decoder is directly linked to the bit and phase syndromes
of the CSS code.
Finally, we would like to point out the connections to
recent work on complementary channels. In [48, 49, 50],
it has been shown that a correctable channel implies that
the complementary channel is private, and vice versa.
Theorems 2 and 3 are essentially a static version of this
(dynamic) result, applied to bipartite states instead of
channels and starting from different assumptions.
VII. CONCLUSION
We provide a characterization of private states in terms
of a complementary information tradeoff and generalize
the security proof methods based on entanglement distil-
lation and the uncertainty principle. This generalization
is formulated as a one-shot distillation theorem (Theo-
rem 4). Exploiting this framework, we give alternative
proofs of the quantum Csisza´r-Ko¨rner bound on distill-
able secret key (Theorem 5 and Lemma 2) and the hash-
ing inequality on distillable entanglement (Theorem 6).
One of the main applications of this work is of course
to QKD, particularly proofs for realistic protocols. These
involve more physical systems than just those describ-
ing the keys and the eavesdropper, and one challenge has
been determining how to use information the honest par-
ties have about such systems. Including the shield system
into the security analysis and picturing the QKD process
as private state distillation gives a general method for do-
ing so, a point also emphasized by Koashi [10]. The im-
portance of these extra systems is how they contribute to
knowledge of hypothetical conjugate basis measurements
made on the key system of either party.
This is dramatically exemplified by Koashi’s security
proof of the BB84 protocol with uncharacterized detec-
tors, which proceeds by noting that this protocol directly
furnishes Bob with an estimate of Alice’s conjugate basis
result, regardless of the detector details. Our results pro-
vide a more detailed and complete picture of how shield
systems contribute to privacy, which should expand the
range of protocol and device imperfections that can be
treated. For instance, it would be interesting to inves-
tigate the unconditional security of QKD protocols that
are not permutation invariant [51, 52]. This possibility is
particularly appealing since Theorem 4 does not require
a permutation of the input state nor does it depend on a
particular method of parameter estimation. We plan to
examine these issues and other implications for realistic
protocols in an upcoming publication.
As a final remark, we note that our approach to the
hashing inequality is closely related to [47], which also
makes use of an information-uncertainty relation. In
fact, that relation is simply the “quantum” version of the
complementary information tradeoff, Lemma 1, replacing
the classical conditional entropy H with the classical-
quantum conditional entropy S to obtain
S(ZA|E) + S(X˜A|B) ≥ log2 d (19)
for any state ρABE , conjugate observables ZA and X˜A,
and d = dim(A). As the “classical” version can easily be
generalized to nonconjugate observables simply by using
the general form of the entropic uncertainty relation, it
becomes reasonable to ask if the “quantum” version of
the same holds as it does for strictly conjugate observ-
ables. Numerical evidence supports this claim, and we
explore this subject in more detail in [53].
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APPENDIX A: APPROXIMATE PRIVATE STATE
PROOFS
Here we present the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3.
Proof of Theorem 2. Write the purification of ψABS as
|ψ〉ABSE = ∑jk√pjk|jk〉AB|ϕjk〉SE for some (normal-
ized) states |ϕjk〉SE . Copying the standard basis of Bob’s
state to a blank register |0〉B′ with the unitary CBB′
yields |ψ1〉ABSEB′ =
∑
jk
√
pjk|jk〉AB|k〉B′ |ϕjk〉SE .
Let ψ¯ABB
′SE
1 be the state after measuring Z
A and
ZB and consider the related state |ψ′1〉ABB
′SE =∑
k
√
pjk|jj〉AB|k〉B′ |ϕjk〉SE . Performing the same mea-
surement on ψ′ and computing the trace distance be-
tween the states, we find
Tr|ψ¯ABE1 − ψ¯′ABE1 | = 2
∑
j 6=k
pjk = 2pe ≤ 2ǫz. (A1)
Observe that |ψ′1〉ABB
′SE = CAB|ψ〉AB′SE |0〉B. Rewrite
the original state as |ψ〉AB′SE = ∑x√qx|x˜〉A|ϑx〉B′SE
for some probability distribution qx and normalized
states |ϑx〉B′SE . Coherently performing the Λ˜B′Sy mea-
surement with unitary UB
′ST , where the extra system T
stores the result, we find
|ψ2〉 = CABUB
′ST |ψ〉AB′SE |0〉B|0〉T (A2)
=
∑
xy
√
qxC
AB|x˜〉A|0〉B
√
Λ˜B′Sy |ϑx〉B
′SE |y〉T . (A3)
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Define |ψ′2〉 =
∑
x
√
qx√
1−epe
CAB |x˜〉A|0〉B
√
Λ˜B′Sx |ϑx〉B
′SE |x〉T ;
its fidelity with |ψ2〉AB′SET is
〈ψ2|ψ′2〉 =
√
1− p˜e ≥
√
1− ǫx. (A4)
In general, the fidelity between two quantum states is
defined as F (ρ, σ) := Tr|√ρ√σ|. Note that |ψ′2〉ABB
′SET
is a private state with key systems AB and shield B′ST .
One way to see this is to rewrite |x˜〉 in terms of |k〉,
|ψ′2〉 =
1√
d
∑
kx
√
qx√
1− p˜e
eiθkx |kk〉AB
√
ΛB′Sx |ϑx〉B
′SE |x〉T .
Applying the unitary operator WBT =
∑
kx e
−iθkxPBk ⊗
PTx results in a maximally entangled state |Φ〉AB in the
AB subsystem. Since WBT is a twisting operator, |ψ′2〉
is a private state.
If we now define |ψ3〉ABB′SET = U †B′ST |ψ′2〉ABB
′SET ,
also a private state since U †B
′ST acts only on the shield,
it follows from unitary invariance of the inner product
that
F
(
|ψ3〉ABB
′SET , |ψ′1〉ABB
′SE |0〉T
)
≥ √1− ǫx. (A5)
Finally, bound the trace distance with the fidelity, us-
ing the relation Tr|ρ− σ| ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2. This implies
Tr|ψ¯ABE3 − ψ¯′ABE1 | ≤ 2
√
ǫx, and using the triangle in-
equality we obtain Tr|ψ¯ABE − ψ¯ABE3 | ≤ 2(ǫz+
√
ǫx).
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume Eve holds the purification
of ψABS and measure AB to create the key. This yields
ψ¯ABE =
∑
jk(P
A
j ⊗ PBk )ψABE(PAj ⊗ PBk ). A simple
and direct calculation using the triangle inequality gives
2pe ≤ Tr|ψ¯AB − κAB|. Since ψABS is an ǫ-approximate
private state, Tr|ψ¯ABE − κABE| ≤ 2ǫ. Tracing out E
does increase this distance, therefore pe ≤ ǫ.
To prove the analogue statement for the conjugate
basis, we must define a suitable Λ˜BS . For this we
adapt the corresponding measurement from the purifi-
cation of κABE , which is a private state. First bound
the fidelity with the trace distance, using the fact that
1 − 12Tr|ρ − σ| ≤ F (ρ, σ) [37]. Thus F (ψ¯ABE , κABE) ≥
1 − ǫ. Uhlmann’s theorem asserts that for any pu-
rification |ψ〉ABER of ψ¯ABE , there exists a purifica-
tion |κ〉ABER of κABE such that F (ψ¯ABE , κABE) =
F (|ψ〉ABER, |κ〉ABER). We can set R = SA′B′
and take the former purification to be |ψ〉ABER :=
CAA
′
CBB
′ |ψ〉ABSE |0〉A′ |0〉B′ for CAA′ and CBB′ unitary
operations such that CAA
′ |k〉A|0〉A′ = |k〉A|k〉A′ .
By definition, |κ〉ABER is an exact private state,
and so is |κ′〉ABER := C†AA′C†BB′ |κp〉ABER.
Since fidelity is invariant under a unitary trans-
formation, F (|ψ〉ABSE |0〉A′ |0〉B′ , |κ′〉ABER) =
F (|ψ〉ABER, |κ〉ABER). Hence there exists Λ′BRy
such that measuring P˜Ax ⊗ Λ′BRy on |κ′〉ABER produces
the uniform distribution 1
d
δxy. Making the same
measurement on |ψ〉ABSE |0〉A′ |0〉B′ results in some
probability distribution q˜xy. Observe that measuring
Λ′BRy on |ψ〉ABSE |0〉A
′ |0〉B′ is the same as measuring
ΛBSy := 〈00|A
′B′Λ′BRy |00〉A
′B′ on |ψ〉ABSE .
Since a quantum operation cannot decrease the fidelity,
we immediately have F (|ψ〉ABSE |0〉A′ |0〉B′ , |κ′〉ABER) ≤
F (q˜xy,
1
d
δxy). But
F
(
q˜xy,
1
d
δxy
)
=
1√
d
∑
x
√
q˜xx ≤
√∑
x 6=y
q˜xy =
√
1− p˜e
(A6)
by the concavity of the square root function. Collecting
the inequalities, we find p˜e ≤ 2ǫ− ǫ2.
APPENDIX B: STATIC HSW THEOREM
Suppose a source described by the ensemble E =
{pk, ϕk} distributes classical letters k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , d−1}
to Alice and quantum states ϕk to Bob. Alice would
like to communicate the value of k to Bob, using as few
resources as possible. Bob already possesses some infor-
mation about k in the form of ϕk, but in general cannot
reliably distinguish between all these states. But Bob
can learn k if Alice reveals some information about k, a
“hint” that narrows the set of ϕk to some that he can
reliably distinguish.
This is the “static” version, first studied in [54, 55], of
the standard HSW scenario in which Alice actively en-
codes the information s she wants to send to Bob using
the signal ensemble E [23, 24]. Typically this problem
is considered in the asymptotic setting of many identi-
cal and independent samples from E . Alice then encodes
her information into a block of such samples and Bob
performs a collective measurement, a version of the so-
called pretty good measurement (PGM) [56], to decode
the message. Properties of typical sequences and sub-
spaces are used to prove that the PGM has a low proba-
bility of error.
Although in the main text we are concerned with us-
ing linear functions to generate the side information, in
this appendix we shall consider the more general method
of universal hashing [57] (also called 2-universal hash-
ing), since it is not any more difficult and random linear
functions are universal. In universal hashing the hint
is generated by choosing a random f : {0, . . . , dn−1} →
{0, . . . ,m−1} from a family F of hash functions and com-
puting t = f(x). Each function defines the subset St of
possible inputs having the same output value; hopefully
Bob will be able to distinguish between the elements of
this set. The family is called universal when the prob-
ability of collision, f(x) = f(y) for x 6= y, is the same
as for random functions: Prf [f(x) = f(y)] ≤ 1/m. Put
differently, the probability of any two elements being in-
cluded in some St is also the same as if Alice chose the
subsets completely at random, which is random enough
for the procedure to work.
In the i.i.d. scenario Alice and Bob share n copies of the
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state ψAB =
∑d−1
k=0 pkP
A
k ⊗ϕBk , which we write as ΨAB =∑
k pkP
A
k ⊗ ϕBk . By the following static HSW theorem,
a hint roughly of size log2m = n [H(pk)− χ(pk, ϕk)] =
n
[
H(ZA)− I(ZA:B)] suffices for Bob to learn k with
exponentially small average probability of error.
Theorem 7 (Static HSW Theorem for Universal Hash
Functions). For n copies of an arbitrary state of the form
ψAB =
∑d−1
k=0 pkP
A
k ⊗ϕBk , fix δ > 0. Then for a universal
family of hash functions f : {0, . . . , dn−1} → {0, . . . ,m−
1} where log2m = n
[
H(ZA)− I(ZA:B) + 4δ] there ex-
ist measurements Λf(k),ℓ such that
pe =
〈∑
ℓ 6=k
Tr
[
Λf(k),ℓ ϕk
]〉
f,k
≤ 6 · 2−nδ2 . (B1)
Proof. Fix a δ > 0 and start by Alice measuring her share
of the state in the computational basis. With probability
greater than 1 − ǫ for ǫ = e−nδ22 , the resulting string k
is typical, meaning k ∈ T nδ = {ℓ|2−nH(pk)−nδ ≤ pℓ ≤
2−nH(pk)+nδ} [58]. If k is not typical, the protocol aborts.
If it does not abort, Alice randomly picks f from a
universal family F and sends f(k) to Bob via the pub-
lic channel. This narrows the set of possible k to the
subset Cf(k) of typical elements of Sf(k). Bob will try
to determine k by making a measurement to distinguish
the ϕℓ for ℓ ∈ Cf(k). For this he uses the PGM defined
by Eq. (11) in [23], which is represented by the POVM
elements
ΛBf(k),ℓ =
( ∑
ℓ∈Cf(k)
QQℓQ
)− 12
QQkQ
( ∑
ℓ∈Cf(k)
QQℓQ
)− 12
,
where Q and Qk are the projections into the typical sub-
spaces (subspaces spanned by eigenstates with typical
eigenvalues) of ϕ¯⊗n and ϕk, respectively. For a specific
f and k, a bound for the average error probability of this
measurement is given by Eq. (17) of [23], except that we
do not yet need to average over all codewords,
pe(k) ≤ 3Tr[ϕk(1−Q)] + Tr[ϕk(1−Qk)]
+
∑
ℓ∈Cf(k)
Tr[QϕkQQℓ] + ηk,
where ηk is 1 if k is typical and 0 otherwise. In our case,
we are interested in the probability of error averaged over
all f and k, i.e. 〈Pe(k)〉f,k. To compute it, we need the
following relations (see [23] for details):
Tr[ϕ¯⊗n(1−Q)] ≤ ǫ, (B2)
〈Tr[ϕk(1−Qk)]〉k ≤ ǫ, (B3)
Qk ≤ 2n
P
i piS(ϕi)+nδϕk, (B4)∑
k∈T n
δ
ϕk ≤ 2nH(pi)+nδϕ¯⊗n, (B5)
||Qϕ¯⊗nQ||∞ ≤ 2−nS(ϕ¯)+nδ, (B6)
where ||M ||∞ is the maximal eigenvalue of M . Since
〈ϕk〉k = ϕ¯⊗n, we have
〈Pe(k)〉k,f ≤ 5ǫ+ 〈
∑
µ∈Cf(k)
Tr[QϕkQQµ]〉k,f
≤ 5ǫ+ 〈
∑
µ∈T n
δ
Prf [f(µ) = f(k)]Tr[QϕkQQµ]〉k.
Straightforward calculations give
〈Pe(k)〉k,f ≤ 5ǫ+ 1
m
2nH(pi)+n
P
i piS(ϕi)+2nδ Tr[Qϕ¯⊗nQϕ¯⊗n]
≤ 5ǫ+ 1
m
2nH(pi)−nS(ϕ¯)+n
P
i piS(ϕi)+3nδ,
where for the last step we use the relation
Tr[Qϕ¯⊗nQϕ¯⊗n] ≤ ||Qϕ¯⊗nQ||∞Tr[ϕ¯⊗n] = ||Qϕ¯⊗nQ||∞.
Choosing log2m ≥ n [H(pi)− S(ϕ¯) +
∑
i piS(ϕi) + 4δ]
completes the proof.
APPENDIX C: UNIVERSAL DISTRIBUTION
FOR STABILIZERS OF CSS CODES
The question we answer in this section is how to pick
a family of CSS codes such that both the Z- and X-type
stabilizers are universal hash functions. The difficulty is
that the two stabilizers are not independent; they must
commute with each other. The Z and X stabilizers can
be represented by an mz by n matrix Mz and the mx by
n matrixMx, respectively, where each entry is an integer
modulo d. We have the following
Lemma 3. Consider the set of all mx +mz by n matri-
ces R such that each row is orthogonal to the others and
where each entry is an integer modulo a prime number d.
Let Mz be the first mz rows of R, and Mx be the last mx
rows of R. Then the linear functions associated with Mz
and Mx are both universal.
Proof. Let ri be the ith row of R. All possible strings
have the same probability to be r1. Therefore, for any
distinct n dit-strings k and k′, PrR[r1 · k = r1 · k′] = 1d .
This is not generally true if d is not prime. Now we
proceed by induction. Assume that we have a set Rℓ of
strings r1, r2, ... and rℓ such that PrR[ri ·k = ri ·k′ | 1 ≤
i ≤ ℓ] ≤ 1
dℓ
. Conditional on Rℓ, the next row rℓ+1 is
uniformly distributed over the space of strings orthogonal
to the set Rℓ. If rj · k 6= rj · k′ for some 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, then
Pr[ri · k = ri · k′ | 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ + 1] = 0. So we can
consider only the case in which ri · k = ri · k′ for all
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ. In that situation, k − k′ can be expended in
any basis of the space orthogonal to Rℓ (the coefficients
being integers from 0 to d−1). Pick one such basis. rℓ+1
is uniformly distributed over all strings that are spanned
by this basis, therefore PrR|Rℓ [rℓ+1 · k = rℓ+1 · k′] = 1d ,
where we assumed ri · k = ri · k′ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
Including all possible cases, we deduce that PrR[ri · k =
ri · k′ | 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ+ 1] < 1dℓ+1 .
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Since there is no distinction between the order of the
rows of R, we conclude that any function associated with
a matrix composed of a subset of rows of R is universal.
APPENDIX D: ON THE ONE-SHOT
DISTILLATION THEOREM
Parameter estimation aside, Theorem 4 is stronger
than the security proof of [10]. Constructing an exam-
ple where this is the case is not too difficult and we will
simply give an example in which the optimal Λ˜BSβ for
guessing Alice’s conjugate basis measurement is not in-
dependent of β. Consider two copies (i.e. n = 2) of the
state
|ψ〉ABSE = 1
2
(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B)|φ0〉S |0〉E
+
1
2
(|0〉A|0〉B − |1〉A|1〉B)|φ1〉S |1〉E ,
where |φ0〉 and |φ1〉 are two different non-orthogonal
states. Bob can guess Alice’s key without an error by
measuring his state in the computational basis. His abil-
ity to predict the conjugate basis will depend on the over-
lap of |φ0〉 and |φ1〉. Assuming this is not nearly maxi-
mal, Alice will have to provide Bob with some additional
information, which in this case would be the result of
measuring some set of stabilizers. Measuring two stabi-
lizers defeats their purpose, since then no secret key can
be distilled. Hence Alice measures either X ⊗X , X ⊗ 1
or 1⊗X . The case where X ⊗1 or 1⊗X is used simply
reduces to the case in which Alice and Bob only share one
state |ψ〉ABSE . In that case, Bob’s minimum error prob-
ability of guessing Alice’s measurement in the conjugated
basis is given by 12− 12
√
1− |〈φ0|φ1〉|2 (which follows from
Helstrom’s result [33] for pure states) and the measure-
ment used is independent of β. However, if X⊗X is used
instead, then the minimum error probability of the opti-
mal measurement given any β is 12 − 12
√
1− |〈φ0|φ1〉|4,
which is smaller than 12 − 12
√
1− |〈φ0|φ1〉|2. For each
value of β, the optimal measurement is, for β = 0, the
two projections Pˆ β=0± on the range of the positive and
negative parts of (φS0 )
⊗2 − (φS1 )⊗2 and the extra projec-
tion so that the sum of them is 1. For β = 1, the optimal
measurement is the two projections Pˆ β=1± on the range
of the positive and negative parts of φS0 ⊗ φS1 − φS1 ⊗ φS0
added with an extra projection so that the sum of them
is 1. Since the projection Pˆ β=0+ overlaps with both Pˆ
β=1
± ,
the optimal measurement Λ˜BSβ cannot be independent of
β.
Despite this example, we have not shown that the
asymptotic rates of some protocols (for n → ∞) could
not be achieved using a measurement Λ˜BS that is inde-
pendent of β, but it seems reasonable to conjuncture that
this is the case. Even if it were unnecessary, allowing Λ˜BS
to depend on β does help to prove Theorems 5 and 6.
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